Internet Access Providers (APs) have built massive network platforms by which end-users and Content Providers (CPs) can connect and transmit data to each other. Traditionally, APs adopt one-sided pricing schemes and obtain revenues mainly from end-users. With the fast development of data-intensive services, e.g., online video streaming and cloud-based applications, Internet traffic has been growing rapidly. To sustain the traffic growth and enhance user experiences, APs have to upgrade network infrastructures and expand capacities; however, they feel that the revenues from end-users are insufficient to recoup the corresponding costs. Consequently, some APs, e.g., Comcast and AT&T, have recently shifted towards twosided pricing schemes, i.e., they start to impose termination fees on CPs' data traffic in addition to charging end-users.
The full version of this paper, including models, theoretic analysis, and numerical simulations, is available at http://arxiv.org/abs/1704.03641. The authors, X. Wang and Y. Xu, are also with AnHui Province Key Laboratory of High Performance Computing (USTC). This work is supported in part by National Science Foundation of China (61379038), Huawei Innovation Research Program, Singapore MoE grant R-252-000-572-112, and National Research Foundation, Prime Minister's Office, Singapore under its Corporate Laboratory@University Scheme, National University of Singapore, and Singapore Telecommunications Ltd. Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the Owner/Author(s). Copyright held by the owner/author(s). SIGMETRICS '17, June 5-9, 2017, Urbana-Champaign, IL, USA ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-5032-7/17/06. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10. 1145/3078505.3078588 In this work, we propose a novel model of a two-sided congested network built by an AP. We model network congestion as a function of AP's capacity and network throughput, which is also a function of the congestion level. We use different forms of the functions to capture congestion metric based on different service models, e.g., M/M/1 queue or capacity sharing, and user traffic based on different data types, e.g., online video or text. We characterize users' population and traffic demand under pricing and congestion parameters and derive an endogenous system congestion under an equilibrium. Based on the equilibrium model, we explore the structures of twosided pricing which optimize the AP's profit and social welfare. We analyze the sensitivities of the optimal pricing under varying model parameters, .e.g., the capacity of the AP and congestion sensitivity of users. By comparing the two types of optimal pricing, we derive regulatory implications from the perspective of social welfare. Besides, we also evaluate the incentives of the AP and regulators to adopt the two-sided pricing instead of the traditional one-sided pricing that only charges on the user side.
The main results and implications of our work include the following. First, the structures of optimal pricing are related with an elasticity of system throughput, which reflects the effects of congestion on two-sided networks. Our result shows that to optimize the profits, APs should set two-sided prices to equalize the demand hazard rates on the user and CP sides, whose optimal value changes with the elasticity of throughput. However, to protect social welfare, the prices should be regulated such that the difference in the demand hazard rates of the two sides will enlarge as the elasticity of throughput decreases. Second, the changes of optimal pricing under varying AP's capacity and users' congestion sensitivity are largely driven by the type of data traffic. In particular, our result implies that when network traffic is mainly for online video, APs would increase two-sided prices under expanded capacity, while regulators may want to tighten the price regulation on the side of higher market power. However, when network traffic is mostly for text content, they should take the opposite operations. Third, as the capacities of APs and the demand for video traffic grow in the current Internet, APs and regulators will have increasing incentives to shift from the traditional one-sided pricing to the two-sided pricing because it will bring higher growth rates for both APs' profit and social welfare. 
